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Job Mobility and the Market for Lawyers 
Robert M. Sauer 
Tel Aviv University 
This paper studies the life cycle career choices of law school gradu- 
ates using unique data from the University of Michigan Law 
School. The model assumes that these graduates act according to 
the optimal solution of a dynamic optimization problem in which 
they sequentially choose among five employment sectors. The em- 
ployment sectors are differentiated by pecuniary and nonpecuni- 
ary returns, promotion and dismissal probabilities, and the extent 
of transferability of human capital. The estimation of the model 
reveals a self-selection mechanism, based on unobserved heteroge- 
neity in abilities and expected future returns, which plays a critical 
role in reproducing the sector-specific nonmonotonic separation 
hazards observed in the data. The underlying self-selection mecha- 
nism also has implications for policy interventions in the market 
for lawyers, such as loan forgiveness programs. 
I. Introduction 
This paper studies the firstjob choice and subsequent labor mobility 
of law school graduates. The model assumes that these individuals 
behave as though they were solving a finite-horizon, discrete-choice 
dynamic programming problem under uncertainty. The structural 
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[Journal of Political Economy, 1998, vol. 106, no. 1] 
? 1998 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-3808/98/0601-0006$02.50 
147 
148 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
parameters of the optimization problem are estimated using unique 
data on several cohorts of graduates from the University of Michigan 
Law School. This study contributes to both the specific literature on 
the market for lawyers and the general literature on job mobility. It 
contributes to the specific literature by explicitly modeling attor- 
neys' career choices. Attorneys are assumed to make joint and se- 
quential job choice decisions among five employment sectors, which 
are differentiated by pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns, promo- 
tion and dismissal probabilities, and the extent of transferability of 
human capital. The study's contribution to the general literature is 
the innovative explanation for the nonmonotonic separation haz- 
ards that arise in this particular labor market. It is shown that a self- 
selection mechanism, based on expected future returns and individ- 
ual ability type, assumed known to the worker and the employer but 
not to the researcher, is capable of reproducing the sector-specific 
nonmonotonic separation hazards observed in the data. 
The theoretical framework of the model builds on the work of 
Weisbrod (1983) and Goddeeris (1988), in which attorneys choose 
between employment in a nonprofit sector and employment in pri- 
vate law firms, considering both pecuniary and nonpecuniary as- 
pects of the job. From the findings of Spurr (1987), the choice set 
is expanded by separating private law firms into two distinct sectors, 
depending on firm size, which may promote or dismiss associates at 
different rates. Promotion and dismissal in both private law firm sec- 
tors are assumed to take place within an up-or-out employment 
structure, thus integrating the work of Gilson and Mnookin (1989) 
and O'Flaherty and Siow (1995). The choice set is further expanded 
by introducing separate business and sole proprietor sectors that 
may offer low degrees of transferability of human capital. Attorney 
choices among these sectors take into account future job opportuni- 
ties and wage offers that depend on endogenously accumulated 
sector-specific work experience (Eckstein and Wolpin 1989a; Wol- 
pin 1992), time since graduation, and attorney ability. This is in con- 
trast to earlier work that has generally not incorporated the future 
considerations implicit in current job choices. 
In order to explain nonmonotonic separation hazards observed 
in a variety of labor markets, including the market for lawyers, the 
general literature on job mobility has almost exclusively relied on 
the theory of job matching (Jovanovic 1979). The job-matching 
model assumes that productivity (or ability type) is revealed gradu- 
ally over time to both worker and employer. In this paper, nonmono- 
tonic hazard rates are generated, instead, by way of a self-selection 
mechanism in which ability types are known by worker and employer 
at the outset. The self-selection arises since high-ability attorneys 
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face high future promotion probabilities in the private law firm sec- 
tors. As soon as private law firm job offers arrive, high-ability attor- 
neys enter these sectors, in which they have higher expected future 
earnings. Low-ability attorneys, in contrast, face low probabilities of 
future promotion, or high probabilities of dismissal, and hence exit 
the private law firm sectors after a short time. For these latter attor- 
neys, private law firms serve as vehicles to high-paying jobs in other 
sectors of the market. This self-selection mechanism also has impli- 
cations for policy interventions in the market for lawyers. To illus- 
trate this, a loan forgiveness program is simulated and shown to have 
a sustained impact on the supply decisions of only low-ability attor- 
neys. 
The structural parameters of the model, which are used to assess 
model fit and simulate the policy intervention, are recovered by re- 
peatedly solving the dynamic optimization problem and maximizing 
a likelihood function that reflects choices and wages observed for 
each attorney over a 15-year period since graduation. For the years 
in which wages are reported, only the wages in the chosen sectors 
are known. The solution of the dynamic program serves to correct 
the accepted wages so that wage function estimates represent wages 
offered by firms. The model is shown to fit the observed data quite 
well in several dimensions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes 
the data. Section III presents the behavioral model. Section IV con- 
tains the estimation results and an evaluation of model fit. In Section 
V, the implications of the model are discussed in terms of the impor- 
tance of unobserved heterogeneity in abilities and the effect of a 
loan forgiveness program. Section VI presents conclusions. The Ap- 
pendix outlines the solution and estimation method. 
II. Data 
The University of Michigan Law School has been collecting data 
from surveying all alumni since 1952. This paper uses data from the 
surveys sent both 5 and 15 years after graduation to the classes of 
1972-75. These classes contain a total of 1,691 individuals, 1,043 
(61.7 percent) of whom answered the 15-year survey.' The largest 
subgroup of respondents is 888 white males, and only this subgroup 
1 Emphasis is placed on the 15-year surveys since the 5-year surveys are a less com- 
prehensive source of longitudinal information. Prior to 1972, 15-year surveys were 
lacking in important details, and the 15-year survey of the class of 1975 was the last 
available at the time this study began. Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993) also 
used these class years. 
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is used in estimation.2 Reasonably accurate 15-year employment his- 
tories could be constructed for 693 of these respondents. 
Assignments to the different employment sectors in years 1, 5, and 
15 after graduation were made first as follows. Sole proprietors were 
placed in the solo sector. An attorney employed in a Fortune 500 
company, bank or other financial institution, accounting firm, insur- 
ance firm, other business organization, or other service organization 
was placed in the business sector.3 An attorney employed in federal 
government, state or local government, legal services, public inter- 
est, or an educational institution was placed in the nonprofit sector.4 
If an attorney was employed in a private law firm, then a cutoff firm 
size determined assignment to the nonelite (small private law firm) 
or elite (large private law firm) sector. In order to account for differ- 
ential growth in private law firms, the cutoff number of attorneys 
was allowed to vary over time and geographical location. In year 15, 
a firm outside of New York with fewer (more) than 100 attorneys 
and a firm inside New York with fewer (more) than 200 attorneys 
was considered nonelite (elite). In years 5 and 1, the nonelite/elite 
cutoffs were 50 and 35, respectively, regardless of location.5 Private 
law firm attorneys could also be classified as associates or partners 
in years 5 and 15. 
Completion of the longitudinal record was straightforward for an 
attorney who reported, on the 15-year survey, one or two jobs held 
since graduation and the number of years on the current job. If 
more than two jobs were reported, then the reported number of 
years spent in government and number of years spent in private prac- 
tice were generally needed. 
Table 1 shows the sectoral choice distribution (actual) over the 
first 15 years since graduation from law school. Several trends are 
evident. Only 10 percent of the sample chose first jobs in either 
2 83 white female respondents, the next largest subgroup, were not included 
in the model since a substantial proportion chose home production or part-time 
work after graduation. Only 10 white males chose these options at some point in 
their careers. 
3In year 15, 40.7 percent of business attorneys worked in Fortune 500 companies 
and 35.1 percent of business attorneys were no longer practicing law. These latter 
attorneys were included in the sample following the assumption that a law degree 
was an essential part of their marketability. 
4In year 15, 78.5 percent of nonprofit attorneys were employed in federal govern- 
ment, state or local government, or legal services; 17.7 percent were employed in 
education. 
5The year 5 and 1 cutoffs were selected after examining firm growth rates in the 
subsample of attorneys who had only one job and were classified as either nonelite 
or elite according to the 15-year cutoff. Similar cutoffs were used by Kornhauser 
and Revesz (1995). Similar firm growth rates over this period are reported in 
Galanter and Palay (1991). 
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TABLE 1 
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED CHOICE DISTRIBUTIONS 
Year Solo Business Nonprofit Nonelite Elite 2X 
1 .027 (.027) .071 (.071) .185 (.185) .405 (.405) .312 (.312) .00 
2 .035 (.026) .069 (.071) .186 (.180) .400 (.413) .310 (.310) 1.07 
3 .042 (.024) .076 (.081) .175 (.187) .410 (.401) .297 (.306) 3.69 
4 .052 (.033) .092 (.095) .162 (.182) .405 (.401) .289 (.289) 3.74 
5 .062 (.048) .104 (.108) .149 (.170) .411 (.406) .274 (.268) 2.47 
6 .068 (.055) .110 (.113) .149 (.163) .417 (.418) .257 (.251) 1.49 
7 .069 (.059) .113 (.120) .141 (.147) .421 (.434) .255 (.240) 1.28 
8 .072 (.064) .124 (.123) .134 (.137) .427 (.442) .242 (.235) .65 
9 .071 (.066) .131 (.126) .133 (.127) .426 (.453) .240 (.228) 1.06 
10 .069 (.074) .137 (.126) .128 (.117) .433 (.459) .232 (.225) 1.42 
11 .072 (.078) .141 (.131) .124 (.108) .436 (.459) .227 (.224) 1.59 
12 .075 (.079) .147 (.131) .124 (.108) .429 (.454) .225 (.227) 2.00 
13 .078 (.082) .149 (.134) .120 (.105) .429 (.450) .225 (.228) 1.62 
14 .079 (.085) .154 (.138) .118 (.097) .426 (.452) .222 (.228) 2.83 
15 .081 (.088) .156 (.153) .114 (.091) .426 (.443) .224 (.225) 2.28 
%24 9.41 2.23 8.50 1.79 .84 
NOTE.-Figures are actual and predicted row percentages for 693 attorneys in each year. Predicted row 
percentages are in parentheses. The critical values are X2(0.05) = 9.49 and X4 (0.05) = 23.68. There 
are no statistically significant differences. 
the solo or business sector, but the proportion steadily grows over 
time to 25 percent. The nonprofit sector contains 18 percent of new 
graduates, with the proportion steadily declining to 11 percent.6 The 
nonelite and elite sectors in year 1 contain 72 percent of the sample. 
The combined proportion subsequently declines to 65 percent, 
whereas the proportion in the nonelite sector slightly increases. 
Table 2 presents the transition matrix (actual), which aggregates 
sectoral transitions.7 The figures indicate a high degree of persis- 
tence in all sectors but the nonprofit sector. The most common desti- 
nation of exiting nonprofit attorneys is the nonelite sector, and tran- 
sitions into the elite sector most likely originate from the nonprofit 
sector. 
Figures 1-3 display sector-specific hazard functions (actual), 
which are nonparametric estimates of the probability that an attor- 
6 higher proportion of firstjob entrants in the nonprofit sector as well as the 
declining proportion over time is not due to temporary judicial clerkships. In year 
1 after graduation, clerks were assigned to their first job sector after completing 
their clerkship. Less than 10 percent of the sample obtained clerkships, and over 
80 percent joined private law firms on their completion. So as not to contaminate 
sector-specific wage offer functions, the reported salaries of clerks are ignored 
(Wood et al. 1993). 
'The matrix does not aggregate transitions period by period for each attorney. 
The diagonals represent the number of attorneys who never switched sectors. Only 
16 attorneys switched sectors more than once. 
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TABLE 2 
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED TRANSITION MATRICES 
SECTOR j 
Fisher Exact 
Test Statistic 
SECTOR i Solo Business Nonprofit Nonelite Elite (Row) 
Solo: 
Actual 15 4 0 2 0 
Predicted 16 4 0 0 0 1.70 
Business: 
Actual 2 37 2 9 1 
Predicted 0 45 1 4 1 4.92 
Nonprofit: 
Actual 15 11 48 46 13 
Predicted 11 9 49 64 15 3.15 
Nonelite: 
Actual 27 28 23 209 9 
Predicted 26 20 22 227 8 3.56 
Elite: 
Actual 9 30 11 34 134 
Predicted 9 30 11 34 133 .07 
Fisher exact test statistic 
(column) 4.05 2.37 2.22 5.85 .49 
NOTE.-The rows represent the origin and the columns the destination. There are no statistically significant 
differences. 
ney exits his first employment sector at time t conditional on not 
having left the sector at time t - 18 Each hazard function rises to 
a global peak in the early years after graduation and declines thereaf- 
ter. The nonprofit and nonelite sector hazard functions peak after 
3 years of sectoral tenure. The elite sector hazard function peaks 
after 4 years.9 
Table 3 reports average accepted real wages (actual), by position, 
in the first, fifth, and fifteenth years after graduation.'0 The figures 
show the highest first-year wages in the business sector and the low- 
est in the solo sector. In year 15, elite partners earn the most and 
nonprofit attorneys the least, less than one-third the earnings of elite 
partners. Standard deviations are generally highest in the solo, busi- 
ness, and partner positions. 
8 The solo and business sector hazard functions are not shown since both of these 
sectors have few first-year entrants and subsequent exits. 
9Nonmonotonic hazard functions for private law firms have appeared before in 
the literature (Spurr 1987; Spurr and Sueyoshi 1994; O'Flaherty and Siow 1995). 
Hazard rates for other sectors in the market for lawyers (e.g., the nonprofit sector) 
have not, to this researcher's knowledge, been previously reported. 
1 Annual wages in other years after graduation were not requested on the surveys. 
JOB MOBILITY 153 
0.17 
0.16 - 
0.15 - 
0.14 I 
0.13- 
0.12 - , 
HO 11 Ig X A /' 
A010 
Z 0 
A 0.09aa a 
Da0 0. 07 
R0.06 / a 
Aa 
TO.05a 
004 1- 91 11 31 
0. 03 a a aa a 
0. 02 a 
0.01 a 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
YEARS OF TENURE 
PLOT + ACTUAL HAZARD RATES 
(3-&- PREDICTED HAZARD RATES 
FIG. 1.-Nonprofit sector hazard functions 
III. Model 
The model of attorney behavior assumes that each attorney, on grad- 
uation from law school and until retirement, sequentially chooses 
among five alternative employment sectors, or seven alternative posi- 
tions, with the objective of maximizing the expected present dis- 
counted value of remaining lifetime wealth, inclusive of the market 
value of nonpecuniary and indirect compensation benefits. The 
choice set, denoted as K, contains a solo position (k = 1), a business 
position (k = 2), a nonprofit position (k = 3), a nonelite associate 
position (k = 4), an elite associate position (k = 5), a nonelite part- 
ner position (k = 6), and an elite partner position (k = 7). The 
choice variable, dk(t), is defined such that dk(t) = 1 if the attorney 
chooses position k at time t and dk( t) = 0 otherwise. All seven alter- 
natives, without loss of generality, are mutually exclusive, implying 
XKl dk(t) = 1. 
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FIG. 2.-Nonelite sector hazard functions 
The attorney's optimization problem over the seven choices can 
be described in terms of a set of alternative-specific value functions, 
each of which obeys the Bellman equation (Bellman 1957). The 
value functions for t ?, T - I and t = T appear, respectively, as 
Vk(S(t)) = wkte-kt + bk 
+ 61 E 3  4ii 789101 2 31 
+ Emax [Vk (S(t + 1))] IS(t) , dk (t) = 
I (1) 
Vk(S(T)) = wkTekT+ bk, 
for kEF K, where T is the terminal period and is interpreted as the 
year of retirement after which the attorney receives retirement bene- 
fits," b and Vkdenotes the expected present discounted value of life- 
" Time T is assumed to be 35 years after law school graduation. The average age 
at graduation is 26, with very little variation. Lengthening the horizon to 40 years 
does not significantly change estimation results. 
JOB MOBILITY 155 
0.11 
0.10 
0. 09 
0. 08 
H 0. 07 
A 
Z 0.06 , 
R 
D0.051 
RO.04 
A 
T 0. 031 ,'' 
E 
 02 
0.01 - 
0. 00 bo 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
YEARS OF TENURE 
PLOT + ACTUAL HAZARD RATES 
C-&tG PREDICTED HAZARD RATES 
FIG. 3.-Elite sector hazard functions 
time wealth in position k given a particular element of the state 
space, S(t), at time t. The current-period return consists of the de- 
terministic component of the wage offer in position k at time t, Wkt, 
and a time-varying, alternative-specific technology shock, Ekt, which 
enters multiplicatively.'2 Yearly retirement contributions, other de- 
ferred or indirect compensation, and the monetary equivalent of 
nonpecuniary benefits are captured by the bk's, 6 is the discount fac- 
tor, and future choices are assumed to be made optimally for any 
given current-period decision.'3 
The state space at time t, consisting of all the factors known to 
12 The wage offer can be viewed as the product of the position-specific equilibrium 
rental price and the number of position-specific skill units possessed by the attorney 
(see Roy 1951). The latter depends on the technology of skill production and is 
subject to shocks. The shocks depend on the vintage of each lawyer rather than on 
calendar time. 
13 Throughout the analysis, 8 is assumed to be .95. 
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TABLE 3 
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED MEAN ACCEPTED WAGES 
Position Year 1 Year 5 Year 15 
Solo: 
Actual 29,793 (12,619) 38,724 (19,640) 76,224 (84,783) 
Predicted 30,825 (16,826) 34,545 (19,939) 65,849 (34,625) 
Business: 
Actual 38,623 (10,828) 55,845 (15,204) 127,040 (75,684) 
Predicted 36,563 (13,082) 50,152 (21,676) 111,788 (47,678) 
Nonprofit: 
Actual 32,395 (8,377) 45,950 (9,636) 59,879 (18,004) 
Predicted 32,294 (8,654) 39,262 (10,495) 62,604 (15,417) 
Nonelite associate: 
Actual 33,366 (7,454) 48,770 (13,162) 65,423 (23,081) 
Predicted 32,205 (6,805) 44,112 (10,343) 77,371 (15,763) 
Elite associate: 
Actual 37,336 (6,074) 57,771 (11,274) 115,124 (47,087) 
Predicted 37,117 (7,926) 56,208 (11,422) 105,752 (15,533) 
Nonelite partner: 
Actual 55,191 (13,212) 138,242 (88,881) 
Predicted 56,924 (24,397) 133,194 (63,422) 
Elite partner: 
Actual 65,873 (12,923) 192,336 (92,936) 
Predicted 69,642 (32,313) 170,851 (70,345) 
NOTE.-Figures are in 1987 dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses. N= 16, 46, 112, 248, and 194 
in year 1, N = 36, 53, 75, 125, 157, 124, and 15 in year 5, and N = 49, 106, 77, 17, 4, 258, and 141 in year 
15. Clerk salaries are not included. 
the individual at time t affecting current returns or the probability 
distribution of future returns, is defined as 
S(t) = {Xlt, X2t, dk(t - 1), A, Ekt} (2) 
for k E K, where xlt denotes the accumulated number of years of 
experience outside of the elite sector at time t and X2t denotes the 
accumulated number of years of experience at time t in only the 
elite sector. This division of experience distinguishes capital between 
sectors in a computationally tractable way.'4 The experience state 
variables evolve according to the following law of motion: 
xi, t+ = xit + di (t) + d2(t) + d3(t) + d4(t) + d6(t), 
X2,t+1 = X2t + d5(t) + d7(t), 
with initial conditions of x1o = x20 = 0. A choice of any of the five 
positions outside of the elite sector thus augments xlt by one year. 
14 Ideally, experience in each of the five sectors would enter the state space sepa- 
rately. This would, however, greatly complicate solution and estimation of the model 
by increasing the number of elements of the state space and the number of parame- 
ters in the model. 
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A choice of either elite associate or elite partner analogously aug- 
ments x2,. The experience terms are assumed to enter quadratically 
into the deterministic component of the wage offer, that is, 
Wkt = exp(l3ok + l3lkXlt+l - 32kX ,t+, + 133kX2,t+1 - 34kX2 ,t+1). (4) 
This specification recognizes the endogeneity of wage offers arising 
from the dependence of experience levels on previous and current 
sectoral choices. The exponentiation ensures nonnegative wages. 
The previous-period choice variables, dk(t - 1), k E K, appear in 
(2) because last period's choice is assumed to affect opportunities in 
the current period. For example, an attorney who chose the business 
sector last period faces a different probability of a current elite offer 
than if he chose the nonprofit sector.'5 The variable A distinguishes, 
by ability level, two types of attorneys. It is zero if the attorney is 
type 1 (low-ability) and one if the attorney is type 2 (high-ability). 
Attorney type is assumed to be common knowledge. The stochastic 
elements of the state space, Ekt, k E K, are allowed to be contempora- 
neously correlated but for simplicity are assumed to be mutually seri- 
ally independent. 
The constraints of the optimization problem lie in the offer proba- 
bility structure. Let Pok denote the probability of receiving an offer 
to work in position k immediately on graduation. The vector of first 
job offer probabilities is assumed to be 
P(1) = {1, P02, P03, P04, P05, 0, 0}. (5) 
That is, graduates can become sole proprietors with certainty, can- 
not enter the labor market as partners, and face stochastic probabili- 
ties of offers in the other positions. 
The on-the-job offer probabilities Pjk, j, k E K, are the probabilities 
of receiving an offer in position k, at the beginning of time t, condi- 
tional on having worked in position j in period t - 1. The Pjk'S form 
a 7 X 7 offer probability matrix specified as 
1 P12 P13 P14 P15 0 0 
1 1 P23 P24 P25 0 0 
1 P32 1 P34 P35 0 0 
P (t) = 1 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 0 (6) 
1 P52 P53 P54 P55 0 P57 
1 1 1 1 P65 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
15 It is possible that current opportunities are affected by choices further into the 
past as well. The assumption that only previous-period choice matters simplifies 
model solution and estimation. 
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for 2 - t ? T. Column 1 assumes that an attorney can always become 
a sole proprietor regardless of prior-period position. The zeros in 
columns 5 and 6 imply that an attorney must spend the prior period 
as an associate before facing a nonzero partnership probability. Non- 
elite partners (row 6) receive offers with certainty in all positions 
but elite associate and elite partner. Elite partners (row 7) receive 
offers with certainty in all positions but nonelite partner. Solo, busi- 
ness, and nonprofit attorneys, like partners, can always continue in 
their respective positions.16 
All offer probabilities except for the associate continuation proba- 
bilities, P44 and P55, and the partnership probabilities, P46 and P57, 
are assumed to be a function of attorney type and time, that is, 
exp[oCjk, 0 + oCjk, A + (Cjk 2I(t ? Ck)7 
1 + exp [1jk, O + ocjk,1A + jk, 2 I(t tk)] (7) 
The appearance of attorney type in the offer probabilities and not 
in the wage offer functions or the benefit terms suggests that type 
is related to an ability characteristic such as capacity to learn on the 
job (Rosen 1972).17 The indicator function I(t 2 tk) equals one if 
the condition in parentheses is true and equals zero otherwise. Its 
presence allows discrete jumps in offer probabilities as time since 
graduation advances. The value of tk iS four for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 
five for k = 5, 7. Attorneys are assumed to know the value of tk for 
k E K. The beginning of the fourth (fifth) year approximates the 
first period in which a nonelite (elite) associate can be considered 
for partner. It is assumed that outside opportunities begin to change 
at this time as well.18 
An up-or-out employment structure in the nonelite and elite sec- 
tors is modeled in the following way. Let the event of coming up for 
review at the beginning of year t be denoted as R(t), with R(t) = 1 
if the associate comes up for review and R( t) = 0 otherwise. A neces- 
16 The restrictions on the offer probability matrix, while empirically motivated, 
help to simplify the expressions for expected future returns. A further but less gen- 
eral assumption could have been introduced that specifies an offer probability of 
one in the nonelite sector if an offer is received in the elite sector. 
17 Indeed, including attorney type in these latter functions does not yield signifi- 
cant results. Attorney type, therefore, affects returns solely through the opportunity 
to receive a fixed wage. No evidence is found that different attorney types differen- 
tially value sector-specific benefits. 
18 The assumption that the fifth year is the first period in which an elite associate 
can be considered for partner is consistent with evidence in Abel (1989) and 
Galanter and Palay (1991). The assumption that a nonelite associate can be consid- 
ered earlier (the fourth year) is consistent with evidence in Spurr (1987). In princi- 
ple, Tk could be estimated but is not since it is integer valued. 
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sary condition for R(t) 1 is t 2 tk. The probability that R(t) = 1 
is denoted as PA4 in the nonelite sector and PG5 in the elite sector. 
The associate continuation probabilities are therefore 
t o when R(t) =1 
1 otherwise 
for k = 4, 5. That is, the associate either will not come up for review, 
in which case remaining an associate is always an option, or will come 
up for review and will either be offered partnership or be dismissed 
from the sector."9 
The partnership probability in the nonelite sector is also condi- 
tional on coming up for review and is specified as 
P46 = 
exp[X46,0 + oe46,lA + OC46,3I(X2t > 0)] when R(t) = 1 
1 + exp [xC46, 0 + Or46, 1 A + oe46,3I(X2t > 0)] 
L0 otherwise. 
The indicator function, I(x2t > 0), equals one if the attorney has 
accumulated any experience in the elite sector at time t and zero 
otherwise. The partnership probability in the elite sector is similarly 
specified as 
P57 = [ exp [OX57, 0 + Oe57, 1 A + oe57,3 I(X1t > 0) when R(t) = 1 
1 + exp[oX57,0 + oC57,IA + oC57,3I(x1t > 0)] 
L0 otherwise, 
where the indicator function, I(xlt > 0), equals one if the attorney 
has accumulated any experience outside of the elite sector at time 
t and zero otherwise. The indicator functions help capture the effect 
of cross experience on partnership probabilities.20 The numerical 
19 O'Flaherty and Siow (1995) model private law firm associates as facing the possi- 
bility of dismissal and promotion in every period after graduation. The requirement 
t tk builds in greater job security in the early years. A permanent associate arises 
in the model when the attorney never comes up for review and never chooses to 
leave the sector. 
20 Expressions for the expected maximum return functions properly complete the 
model. They are not shown for the sake of brevity but can be found in Sauer (1995). 
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solution and maximum likelihood estimation of the model are out- 
lined in the Appendix. 
IV. Estimation Results 
A. Parameter Estimates 
Table 4 provides estimates of the offer probability parameters and 
their associated standard errors. Being a type 2 attorney has a posi- 
tive impact on all first job offer probabilities. These probabilities are 
estimated to be .209, .838, .215, and .201 in the business, nonprofit, 
nonelite associate, and elite associate positions, respectively, if type 
1 and .650, .910, .812, and .358 if type 2. Type 2 attorneys consistently 
face higher on-the-job offer probabilities as well. 
Previous employment sector and time since graduation also affect 
arrival rates. This can be explained by the general and specific train- 
ing attorneys receive (Leibowitz and Tollison 1978). General train- 
ing in the first few years after graduation is presumably useful in all 
positions but may vary in quality depending on employment sector. 
After the first few years, training becomes more sector-specific. The 
higher on-the-job offer probabilities that nonprofit, nonelite, and 
elite attorneys face, regardless of type and time, may reflect higher- 
quality general and more transferable specific training. The quality 
of general training appears to be highest in the elite sector. The 
positive impact of time in the nonprofit sector suggests that specific 
training in this sector is highly transferable.21 
The parameter estimates for the partnership probabilities show 
that being a type 2 attorney has a dramatic effect. The nonelite part- 
nership probability, for an associate with no cross experience, is .037 
if type 1 and .896 if type 2. The elite partnership probability, for an 
associate with no cross experience, is .023 if type 1 and .764 if type 
2. O'Flaherty and Siow (1995) similarly estimate the partnership 
probability for a high-ability-type, large-firm associate to be .746. 
Partnership probabilities are higher for both types in the nonelite 
sector, and cross experience has a positive impact in both sectors.22 
These latter two results are consistent with previous findings in Spurr 
(1987). The positive effect of cross experience on the elite partner- 
21 High-ability attorneys who do not receive offers in private law firms immediately 
after graduation generally prefer the nonprofit sector over the business sector, even 
though the business sector offers higher current-period wages. This result is due 
to higher arrival rates for offers from private law firms in the nonprofit sector. 
22 The estimated probabilities per period of coming up for review are quite close: 
Pc4 = .288 and 1c5 = .309. The standard errors of the estimated intercepts in the 
corresponding logistic functions are .311 and .295, respectively. 
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ship probability probably reflects the importance of litigation skills 
acquired in the nonprofit sector. 
Table 5 presents the estimated parameters of the wage offer func- 
tions along with their standard errors, the estimated standard devia- 
tions of technology shocks, and the estimated dollar values of the 
benefit terms.23 The estimates show that experience in the elite sec- 
tor always has a lower return for sole proprietors, suggesting that 
the general and specific training acquired in the elite sector is not 
particularly valuable in this position. Experience in the elite sector, 
however, always has a higher return in the business sector. This re- 
sult is not surprising given that the clients of elite private law firms 
are mostly large businesses. In the nonprofit sector, the first 6 years 
of elite experience have a higher return, but the return falls off rap- 
idly. Too much specific training in the elite sector thus penalizes 
earnings. In the nonelite associate position, elite experience has a 
higher return after 5 years have been accumulated. Thus only spe- 
cific training is advantageous. Elite experience always has a lower 
return for nonelite partners and a higher return for elite associates 
and elite partners.24 
The estimated benefit terms vary greatly by position. All estimates 
are relative to the nonprofit sector for identification and indicate 
that benefits in this sector have the highest market value. The most 
negative estimates are in the business and elite sectors. The impor- 
tance of factors such as retirement contributions, work hours, and 
work environment in determining these values cannot be assessed 
given the limitations of the data. 
B. Model Fit 
As shown in tables 1 and 2 and figures 1-3, there are no statistically 
significant differences between actual and predicted choice distribu- 
tions, actual and predicted transition matrices, and actual and pre- 
dicted hazard functions.25 Table 3 shows predicted mean accepted 
23Joint estimation of choices and wages corrects the wage function parameter 
estimates for selectivity bias. The wage function parameters are adjusted for unob- 
served heterogeneity through the effect on future job offer probabilities and hence 
current choices. 
24 Returns to experience outside of the elite sector are restricted to be the same 
in the elite associate and partner positions because of a singularity in the data. The 
contemporaneous correlation between associate and partner shocks is .213 in the 
nonelite sector and .258 in the elite sector. All other correlations either were not 
significantly different from zero or were restricted to be zero. 
25 The goodness-of-fit statistics have not been adjusted for the fact that the parame- 
ters of the model have been estimated. The Wilcoxon X2 values for the nonprofit, 
nonelite, and elite sector hazard functions are 1.16, 2.71, and 0.06, respectively. The 
associated p-values are .28, .12, and .81. 
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TABLE 6 
PREDICTED CHOICE DISTRIBUTIONS BY ATTORNEY TYPE 
Year Solo Business Nonprofit Nonelite Elite 
1 .081 (.008) .231 (.012) .392 (.108) .129 (.507) .167 (.365) 
2 .081 (.006) .247 (.006) .392 (.103) .124 (.519) .156 (.367) 
3 .081 (.004) .280 (.008) .430 (.099) .081 (.519) .129 (.371) 
4 .102 (.008) .306 (.018) .452 (.083) .081 (.519) .059 (.373) 
5 .140 (.014) .328 (.028) .446 (.069) .054 (.535) .032 (.355) 
6 .156 (.018) .333 (.032) .446 (.059) .043 (.556) .022 (.335) 
7 .172 (.018) .344 (.037) .435 (.041) .038 (.580) .011 (.323) 
8 .183 (.020) .355 (.037) .419 (.034) .038 (.590) .005 (.320) 
9 .194 (.020) .355 (.041) .398 (.028) .048 (.602) .005 (.310) 
10 .226 (.018) .355 (.041) .371 (.024) .043 (.611) .005 (.306) 
11 .242 (.018) .371 (.043) .355 (.018) .027 (.617) .005 (.304) 
12 .247 (.018) .371 (.043) .360 (.016) .022 (.613) .000 (.310) 
13 .258 (.018) .376 (.045) .349 (.016) .016 (.609) .000 (.312) 
14 .269 (.018) .382 (.049) .328 (.012) .022 (.609) .000 (.312) 
15 .285 (.016) .382 (.069) .317 (.008) .016 (.600) .000 (.308) 
NOTE.-Figures are row percentages calculated separately for 186 type 1 attorneys and 507 type 2 attorneys 
in each year. Row percentages for type 2 attorneys are in parentheses. 
wages to be quite close to actual values in year 1. Differences increase 
somewhat over time. Predicted standard deviations generally repro- 
duce the larger variation in the solo, business, and partner positions. 
V. Discussion 
A. The Importance of Unobserved Heterogeneity 
in Abilities 
The differences in the career choices of type 1 and 2 attorneys are 
clearly illustrated in the predicted choice distributions by type in 
table 6. The table shows 70 percent of type 1 attorneys entering the 
solo, business, and nonprofit sectors immediately after graduation. 
The proportion in these sectors rises to 98 percent in year 15. In 
contrast, 87 percent of type 2 attorneys first enter the nonelite and 
elite sectors, with over 90 percent in these two sectors in year 15. 
The proportion of type 2 attorneys in the nonprofit sector steadily 
approaches zero. 
Differences in attorney type are essential in explaining the non- 
monotonic shape of the hazard functions. The reason for the rise 
and subsequent fall in the elite sector hazard rates is as follows. Im- 
mediately on graduation, type 1 attorneys face V2 > V5 > V4 > 
V3> Vl, where Vk is the average value function in position k. If offers 
do not arrive in the most preferred sector (business) but do arrive 
in the elite sector, then they are accepted. At the beginning of the 
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second year, the ranking remains the same, implying that if business 
offers arrive, type 1 attorneys exit. At the beginning of the third year, 
V2 > 15 7V3 > V4 > V1. Business offers are again accepted, and 
depending on the value of the shock, nonprofit offers are accepted 
as well. By the beginning of the fourth year, 12 > V3 > V4 > 15 > 
V1, implying that business offers, nonprofit offers, and nonelite of- 
fers are all accepted. There is thus an increasing number of type 1 
attorney exits over these periods. The threat of dismissal and the 
drop in offer probabilities beginning with the fifth year cause the 
gradual reduction in 15 relative to the other Vk's. 
At the beginning of the fifth year, many type 1 associates who do 
not receive offers in previous periods are dismissed, generating the 
hazard function peak. The hazard rates subsequently decline since 
the sector contains a greater proportion of type 2 attorneys who have 
monotonically decreasing hazard rates beginning in year 5. The fall 
in the hazard rates is driven by the up-or-out mechanism and the 
result that type 2 attorneys prefer the elite sector throughout the 
horizon. 
The reason for the rise and subsequent fall in the nonelite sector 
hazard rates is quite similar.26 The nonprofit hazard rates, however, 
do not steadily rise before the peak since V3 fails to fall in relative 
value over time because of the absence of a dismissal threat. The 
global peak in the hazard function occurs when the probability that 
type 2 attorneys receive offers in the private law firm sectors in- 
creases. The second peak occurs as type 1 attorneys begin to exit for 
the solo sector. 
Given the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in explaining 
the career choices of attorneys, it would be instructive to determine 
the relationship between background characteristics and attorney 
type. With Bayes's rule, the probability that an attorney is type 2 
conditional on observed choices (d), accepted wages (w), and esti- 
mated parameters (0) can be expressed as 
A 
Pr(A = lId, w, 0) = 
'28 (0 lId, w, A = 1) 
8(OI d,w, A =1) + (1- *) _V(0 Id,w,A=O) 
A 
where Se (O ld, w, A) is the conditional likelihood contribution eval- 
uated at the estimated parameters and Xt is the estimated uncondi- 
26 Type 2 nonelite associates always prefer the elite sector, but most do not receive 
offers and choose to remain in the sector. 
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TABLE 7 
ATTORNEY TYPE LOG ODDS REGRESSION 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept -11.935 11.655 
Undergraduate GPA 8.880 7.187 
Undergraduate GPA2 -1.328 1.102 
Graduate degree -1.444 .682 
Moot court participation .736 .574 
Top 25% law school class 1.068 .359 
Law class 1973 .347 .436 
Law class 1974 .030 .495 
Law class 1975 -.138 .472 
Parent attorney .645 .521 
Educational debt .306 .343 
NOTE.-R2 = .032. Standard errors are not adjusted for the fact that the 
dependent variable has been estimated. 
tional probability of being a type 2 attorney.27 The conditional proba- 
bility of being a type 1 attorney is simply 1 - Pr (A = 1 Id, w, 0). 
Forming the log odds of these posterior probabilities for each attor- 
ney and regressing them on a selected set of observable attorney 
characteristics yields the results in table 7.28 
The estimates show that, ceteris paribus, an increase in an attor- 
ney's undergraduate grade point average increases the log odds the 
attorney is type 2 at a decreasing rate. Having been a moot court 
participant, having graduated in the top 25 percent of the class, and 
having an attorney parent all increase the log odds. These findings 
are consistent with the high-ability interpretation for type 2 attor- 
neys. The achievement of a graduate degree prior to entering law 
school has a negative impact. This result could arise if those who 
switched fields are lemons. That is, a switch occurred because of a 
perceived limited chance of success in the original field. There is 
little correlation between attorney type and graduating class or the 
presence of educational debt.29 
B. Loan Forgiveness 
The estimated parameters of the model can be used to analyze loan 
forgiveness programs in terms of their effect on attorney supply deci- 
27 Probability it = .73. This high estimate of the unconditional probability of being 
a type 2 attorney is probably due to the elite status of the University of Michigan Law 
School. The standard error of the estimated intercept term in the logistic function is 
.234. 
28 The standard errors have not been adjusted for the fact that the dependent 
variable in the regression has been estimated. 
29 There is also no correlation if a high debt indicator replaces the indicator of 
nonzero debt. 
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TABLE 8 
EFFECT OF LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM ON CHOICE DISTRIBUTION 
Year Solo Business Nonprofit Nonelite Elite 
1 .027 (.024) .071 (.072) .185 (.196) .405 (.402) .312 (.306) 
2 .026 (.023) .071 (.077) .180 (.195) .413 (.405) .310 (.300) 
3 .024 (.020) .081 (.083) .187 (.204) .401 (.396) .306 (.296) 
4 .033 (.027) .095 (.097) .182 (.206) .401 (.391) .289 (.279) 
5 .048 (.041) .108 (.109) .170 (.191) .406 (.399) .268 (.260) 
6 .055 (.050) .113 (.111) .163 (.182) .418 (.409) .251 (.247) 
7 .059 (.054) .120 (.119) .147 (.175) .434 (.418) .240 (.234) 
8 .064 (.057) .123 (.119) .137 (.168) .442 (.428) .235 (.229) 
9 .066 (.058) .126 (.124) .127 (.154) .453 (.442) .228 (.221) 
10 .074 (.059) .126 (.126) .117 (.150) .459 (.444) .225 (.220) 
11 .078 (.065) .131 (.130) .108 (.140) .459 (.445) .224 (.220) 
12 .079 (.067) .131 (.131) .108 (.133) .454 (.446) .227 (.223) 
13 .082 (.071) .134 (.135) .105 (.127) .450 (.442) .228 (.225) 
14 .085 (.074) .138 (.138) .097 (.117) .452 (.444) .228 (.227) 
15 .088 (.075) .153 (.154) .091 (.111) .443 (.437) .225 (.223) 
NOTE.-Figures are row percentages predicted by the model (693 attorneys in each year) and the loan 
forgiveness program (683 attorneys in each year). Loan forgiveness program row percentages are in paren- 
theses. 
sions. As an illustration, yearly debt payments are subtracted from 
the benefit terms in all positions but the nonprofit position for the 
first 15 years after graduation. Table 8 shows that this produces a 1.1 
percent increase in the number of attorneys choosing the nonprofit 
sector immediately after graduation. The increased proportion, 
however, is due almost entirely to additional type 1 entrants. Type 
2 attorneys continue to enter the sector only if offers in private law 
firms are not received and exit as soon as these offers arrive, despite 
the increased return to nonprofit sector employment. By year 15, 
there are 2.7 percent more attorneys in the nonprofit sector since 
fewer type 1 attorneys exit for the solo sector.30 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper a dynamic structural model of the career choices of 
attorneys was estimated using unique data on several cohorts of grad- 
uates from the University of Michigan Law School. The theoretical 
framework integrates and expands previous work by Weisbrod 
(1983), Spurr (1987), Goddeeris (1988), and O'Flaherty and Siow 
(1995) by considering the future-oriented job choice decisions of 
attorneys among five employment sectors. The employment sectors 
"0 According to representatives of the University of Michigan Law School, there 
was no loan forgiveness program in effect for this sample of graduates. If they did 
indeed face some type of limited loan forgiveness, part of the influence would al- 
ready be captured in the hba's. 
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are found to be differentiated by pecuniary and nonpecuniary re- 
turns, promotion and dismissal probabilities, and the extent of trans- 
ferability of human capital. 
The estimation results show, in particular, that while partnership 
probabilities in the elite (large private law firm) sector are lower 
than in the nonelite (small private law firm) sector, elite experience 
has investment value in alternative sectors of the market. Elite associ- 
ates face both higher job offer probabilities and higher alternative 
wage offers depending on the number of years of experience accu- 
mulated and the sector to which the experience is transferred. The 
nonprofit sector, in comparison to the business and solo sectors, 
offers lower wages but higher nonpecuniary benefits and higher 
probabilities of receiving job offers in private law firms. The disag- 
gregation of the choice set is important in uncovering these effects. 
Self-selection among the five sectors, based on unobserved ability 
type and expected future returns, is also shown to be a critical ele- 
ment in generating the sector-specific nonmonotonic separation 
hazards observed in the data. The self-selection mechanism has im- 
plications for policy interventions in the market for lawyers, such as 
loan forgiveness programs. 
Several extensions of the model would be desirable. First, learning 
about attorney ability type, as in O'Flaherty and Siow (1995), could 
be introduced. This would help distinguish, in one model, the rela- 
tive contributions of learning and unobserved heterogeneity in pro- 
ducing nonmonotonic hazard functions. Second, incorporating a 
theory of law firm decision making, as in Ferrall (1990) or Rebitzer 
and Taylor (1995), would help better specify the determinants ofjob 
offer and promotion probabilities. Third, including data on female 
attorneys (Wood et al. 1993; Biddle and Hamermesh 1996) might 
reveal gender differences in both job and wage offers while holding 
ability constant. Finally, this type of model can be easily modified to 
explain the career choices in other labor markets that are character- 
ized by specialty sectors with different institutional arrangements. 
Appendix 
The standard solution method for finite-horizon dynamic programs is back- 
ward recursion. To outline the solution method, denote a particular set of 
values for the deterministic components of the state space at time t as S(t), 
and consider an attorney entering the last decision period, t = T, with 
S(T). Given a draw from the assumed multivariate normal distribution of 
technology shocks, the seven terminal value functions can be calculated. 
Consider now an attorney in period T - 1 with S(T - 1). To compute the 
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value functions in this period, expected future returns must be calculated 
for each of the seven possible alternatives, that is, 
| | max EVI (S(T)),., V7(S(T))] 
IlT e7T 
X f(EIT **, E7T; f) dEIT ... dE7T- (Al) 
To overcome computational difficulties, (Al) is approximated by Monte 
Carlo integration, that is, 
D 
-Emax [Vd (S(T)),.., Vd (S(T))] (A2) D 7~ 
D draws from the joint distribution of technology shocks at time Tare taken 
and the maximum values are averaged. The value functions at time T - 1 
can then be calculated with a single random draw on technology shocks in 
the current period. Moving backward in time, one can perform analogous 
computations for every t = 0, . . ., T - 2. The procedure above requires 
calculation of the value functions for every feasible S(t), t E T. 
The solution of the dynamic program serves as input into estimating the 
parameters of the model. To see this, consider the probability of choosing 
the elite sector immediately on graduation from law school as an example 
(suppressing arguments 0, A, and S(1), for convenience): 
Pr[w51, d5U() = 1] = f(w51)Po5 
X [(1- P02)(l - P03)(l - P04)Pr(V5 i VIIw51) 
+ (1- P02) - P03)Po4 Pr (V5 > VI, V5 > V41 W51) 
+ (1 - ) P03 ( - P04) Pr( V5 > VI, V5 > V31 W51) 
+ ( P02)Po3Po4 Pr(V5 > VI, V5 > V3, V5 > V41 W51) (A3) 
+ P02(l - P03)(l - P04)Pr(V5 > VI, V5 > V21W51) 
+ P02(l - P03)Po4Pr(V5 > VI, V5 > V2, V5 > V4IW51) 
+ P02P03(l - P04)Pr(V5 > VI, V5 > V2, V5 > V3IW51) 
+ Po2Po3Po4Pr(Vs > VI, V5 > V2, V5 > V3, V5 > V4IW51)], 
where f(w51) is the lognormal density function. Each Vk, the expected pres- 
ent discounted value of wealth in position k until the end of the horizon 
(T = 35), is provided by the numerical solution to the dynamic program 
for a given draw of technology shocks in t = 1. Choice probabilities are 
constructed by repeatedly drawing current-period technology shocks and 
using a kernel smoothing function (see Albright, Lerman, and Manski 1977; 
McFadden 1989; Pakes and Pollard 1989; Rust 1992). Construction of the 
likelihood function follows the method described in Eckstein and Wolpin 
(1989b) for serially uncorrelated errors with a correction for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Standard errors are calculated using the outer product of 
numerical first derivatives. Keane and Wolpin (1994) discuss properties of 
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the estimator when expected future returns are approximated by Monte 
Carlo integration. Further details on the estimation of this particular model 
are in Sauer (1995). 
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